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THE SAGA OF TWO SHIPS
PASSING IN THE NIGHT
By JOSEPH M. WEILER *
A. INTRODUCTION
There is a general principle of our morality and our criminal law that
individuals should be judged on the facts as they believed them to be. That
principle has never secured the wholehearted support of our judges. Yet the
controversy that arose in the development of the common law after the
Victorian judgment in Regina v. Prince' is still brewing. Indeed, the reluctance
of our judiciary to adhere to the general principle is easily discernible in the
recent decisions of the House of Lords in D.P.P. v. Morgan and the Supreme
Court of Canada in Regina v. Kundeus.3
It is hardly necessary to remind a legal audience of the facts of Prince's
case. Suffice it to say that William Prince abducted Annie Phillips, the girl of
13 who looked 18. When Prince was arrested, he said that he would not have
taken Annie away with him had he not believed her when she told him she
was 18. The jury found on the evidence that his belief that she was 18 was
reasonable. The trial judge referred to the Court for Crown Cases Reserved,
the question of whether Prince's belief constituted a defence to the charge.
The Court decided by a majority of 15 to 1 that the defence of mistake of fact
was not available. Prince was convicted and sentenced to three months im-
prisonment with hard labour.
© Copyright, 1976, Joseph M. Weiler.
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A century after Prince's case, this debate over the status of the so-called
"defence of mistake of fact" has yet to subside.4 Initially the courts in the
United Kingdom and Canada seemed to retreat in unison from the restricted
view of this defence taken by the 15 majority judges in Prince's case.5 How-
ever, the recent decisions in Morgan and Kundeus would appear to suggest
a divergence in the manner in which the highest tribunals of these two coun-
tries will treat instances of mistake of fact.
In Morgan, the House of Lords decided that on a rape charge the Crown
must prove that the accused intended to have intercourse without the consent
of the victim. In that enquiry, an honest belief that the victim was giving
consent, whether based on reasonable grounds or not, would negate the
requisite mens rea for that offence.
In Kundeus, one reading of the majority's decision is that an honest
belief on the part of the accused that he was selling mescaline was irrelevant
to the charge of trafficking in L.S.D. The question of the reasonableness of the
accused's belief was not an issue in Kundeus. The approach taken and the
result reached by the majority is similar to that which our courts had been
avoiding in the centenary marking the aftermath of Prince., For these reasons,
Kundeus deserves a detailed analysis, since on its face it suggests that a new
direction is being adopted by our highest judicial body on the subject of mens
rea and mistake of fact. In particular, the Kundeus decision illustrates that
the Supreme Court is sanctioning the withdrawal from the position which it
adopted in Regina v. Beaver, a retreat which had been augered in decisions
of the British Columbia and Ontario Courts of Appeal.7 Regretfully, while
Kundeus suggests a new direction in the Supreme Court's treatment of mens
rea, the majority decision fails to support its conclusion with any reason which
might explain why such a change in policy is warranted. We are left to
speculate in this regard and to offer our own explanation.
The Kundeus case thus is one of the more significant of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions for two reasons: first, the manner in which the
majority decision dealt with the case is illustrative of its perception of its role
as our court of last resort; and second, the dissenting opinion is interesting
4 A more detailed analysis of Prince's case is found in Cross, "Centenary Reflections"
in Prince's Case, 91 Law Quarterly Review 540.
5 Regina v. Tolson (1889), 23 Q.B.B. 168; Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] 1 Q.B. 918,
ct.; Regina v. McLeod (1954), 20 C.R. 281, (B.C.C.A.); Beaver v. The Queen, [1957]
S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.); Regina v. Rees (1965), S.C.R.; 24 C.R. 1; 115 C.C.C. 1; 4 D.L.R.
(2d) 406; Regina v. Shand, [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 8 (Man. CA.).
0 See, id.
7Regina v. Ladue, 45 C.R. 287; 51 W.W.R. 175, [1965]; 4 C.C.C. 264 (B.C.C.A.);
Regina v. Burgess, [1970] 2 O.R. 216; 3 C.C.C. 268 (C.A.); Regina v. Blondin, [1971]
2 W.W.R. 1; 2 C.C.C. (2d) 118, aff'd, [1972] 1 W.W.R. 479, 4 C.C.C. (2d) 566n (Can.);
Regina v. Custeau, 17 C.R.N.S. 124; [1972] 2 O.R. 250; 6 C.C.C. (2d) 179, (CA.).
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both as an example of a different style of decision-making than that displayed
by the majority and also for its analysis of the meaning of mens rea in the
area of mistake of fact.
B. HOW DID KUNDEUS GET TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA?
Richard Kundeus was charged with unlawfully trafficking in L.S.D. The
only evidence presented at trial was through the Crown's witnesses. A police
constable testified that he and Kundeus were sitting at a local pub and that
Kundeus was calling out 'speed, acid, M.D.A. or hash' to passersby. The
police constable, who was at that time acting undercover, asked for hash or
acid but the accused replied that he was all sold out. The accused then offered
to sell the police constable some mescaline at two dollars. The latter asked for
two hits and gave the accused four dollars. Kundeus then left the room and
returned five minutes later and handed the policeman two capsules. These
capsules, when analysed, proved to contain L.S.D. not mescaline.
Kundeus elected not to adduce any evidence in defence. After having
stated that the only issue was mens rea, the trial judge concluded that "the
prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused."
'8
Kundeus then appealed the conviction on the ground that the trial judge had
misdirected himself in law in convicting Kundeus of trafficking in L.S.D., if
he was satisfied that the accused did not know that the substance was in fact
L.S.D. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the conclusion reached by the
trial judge, refused to follow the reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Regina v. Custeau9 and set aside the conviction.
Mr. Justice McFarlane, J.A., writing for the Court interpreted the reasons
for judgment of the trial judge as finding that although Kundeus did in fact
sell L.S.D., he thought he was selling and intended to sell mescaline. More-
over, the evidence disclosed that the undercover police officer also thought
that he was purchasing mescaline. The issue on appeal then, was whether on
these facts the necessary mens rea had been proved. In a brief decision, with
no discussion as to the meaning or role of mens rea, the Court of Appeal
allowed Kundeus' appeal and directed an acquittal. The reason offered for
this conclusion was that "there is an essential difference between trafficking
in a restricted or controlled drug (L.S.D.) and selling a drug (mescaline)."
Why? Because:
[t]rafficking in a restricted or controlled drugs is prohibited by statute as conduct
harmful in itself, whereas selling mescaline is an offence only in the absence of a
written or verbal prescription. This essential difference is emphasized by the dif-
s Supra, note 3 at 132.
9 Regina v. Custeau, supra, note 7.
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ferent penalties which are applicable and the special definition of 'trafficking' in
ss. 33 and 40 of the Act as opposed to the use of the word 'sell' in the regulation.O
Since the decision of the Court of Appeal was unanimous, it was neces-
sary for the Crown to obtain leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Signifi-
cantly, neither the grounds upon which leave was requested, nor granted are
mentioned in the majority's decision. We must look deep into the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Laskin to find any indication as to the basis upon
which this case came before the Supreme Court. Yet it is clear from the appeal
factums that the only issue upon which leave to appeal was granted, and to
which the factums were directed, concerned the relevance of the accused's
mistake of fact to the charge of trafficking in L.S.D. In short, the Court was
asked to decide a substantive question as to the meaning and role of mens rea.
But the only indication from the Court that this was the sole question to be
decided was an oblique reference on the dissenting opinion to the arguments
presented to the Court by the Appellate Crown.
Chief Justice Laskin, analysing the Crown's arguments, describes the
Crown's position as contending that while proof of the actus reus involved
would not be enough to support a conviction, if the Crown could also prove
the accused had a general intention to traffic in drugs, its case against the
accused for trafficking in L.S.D. would have been made out. To be more
specific, in order for Kundeus to meet the case against him, he could only rely
on a mistake of fact based on reasonable grounds that had the situation been
as he supposed, he would not have attracted culpability for any drug offence."
It is important to note the grounds of appeal and the arguments presented
by counsel to the Supreme Court, because the majority judgment offers two
distinct ratio decidenda for its disposition of the appeal. One reading of Mr.
Justice de Grandpr6's decision would suggest that this judgment is based
solely on grounds of evidence or proof. An alternative analysis of the majority
decision is that it is based on a matter of substantive law, i.e., the legal
10 Supra, note 3 at 134.
Section C. 01.041 of the regulations provides that no person shall sell a substance con-
taining a drug listed or described in Sched. F. to the regulations without a written or
verbal prescription. By virtue of s. 26 of the Act the penalty for violation of the regula-
tions on conviction upon indictment is a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding three years or both.
Section 42 of the Act provides that the penalty for trafficking in a restricted drug upon
conviction or indictment is imprisonment for ten years. Section 34 provides the same
penalty for trafficking in a controlled drug on similar conviction.
The Court of Appeal never directly stated the operative reasons for its eventual dis-
position of the appeal. However, MacFarlane, J.A., disagreed with the decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Custeau, which he described as being decided "per incuriam"
since the court seemed to base its decision on the premise that mescaline is a controlled
drug and that the maximum penalty for trafficking in that substance is the same as that
for selling L.S.D. By inference we can conclude that the learned judge also disagreed
with the conclusion reached in Custeau, i.e., that it was no defence to a charge of
trafficking in L.S.D. that the accused believed he was selling mescaline. Stated in a
positive sense, the British Columbia Court of Appeal must be interpreted as holding that
the accused mistake of fact on the situation described in Custeau and Kundeus would
have afforded him a defence to the charge.
11 Id. at 143.
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relevance of Kundeus' mistake of fact. This latter issue was the sole focus of
the trial judge, the Court of Appeal and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Laskin.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court of Canada's most important
statement in almost two decades on the issue of mistake of fact and criminal
guilt is couched in a decision that affords two separate interpretations. It is
even more disturbing that the first rendition of what the majority meant in its
decision, i.e., whether Kundeus did or did not in fact entertain a nistaken
belief as to the character of the drug he was purporting to sell to the under-
cover police officer, was not an issue in the lower courts nor a ground of appeal
to the Supreme Court. On the contrary, the statement of facts in the factum
filed by counsel in the Supreme Court of Canada, factums which had been
agreed to by both counsel, specifically referred to Kundeus as having an honest
belief that he was selling mescaline. The key issue addressed in the factums
was the relevance of such mistake of fact to the charge of trafficking in L.S.D.
Yet, de Grandpr6, J.'s opinion brings into question the facts upon which the
appeal was based.
C. A LESSON IN OBFUSCATION - WHAT DID THEY DECIDE?
On its face the majority decision does concentrate on how the charge
should be proved rather than what legally must be proven in order to succeed
in a prosecution for the offence. Yet it is not so surprising that the majority
decision can be given these separate interpretations. Presumably, when counsel
for the appellant and respondent appeared to argue this case, they were pre-
pared to argue the substantive issue only. We can only surmise that counsel
could not have been prepared to argue the evidentiary issue, and the result
was an obscure opinion that gives rise to more problems than it solves, and
leaves the crucial substantive issue to be treated as an apparent afterthought.
The majority's decision begins with a reference to the facts in Beaver v.
The Queen,'2 and then goes on to say that:
[ojur facts are different. They are very simple and uncontradicted. One reading of
them is that Kundeus was offering L.S.D. for sale, actually sold L.S.D. and re-
ceived payment therefor. On that reading it is obvious that the conviction should
have been affirmed.13
It is unclear why de Grandpr6, J. cited this version of the facts unless
he is accepting them as his own view. Later in his opinion,' 4 he mentions the
Supreme Court's decision in Regina v. King,15 in particular the obiter remarks
of Mr. Justice Ritchie concerning the charge of impaired driving:
When it has been proved that a driver was driving a motor vehicle while his ability
to do so was impaired by alcohol or a drug, then a rebuttable presumption arises
that his condition was voluntarily induced and that he is guilty of the offence
created by s. 223 and must be convicted unless other evidence is adduced which
12 Beaver v. The Queen, supra, note 5.
13 Supra, note 3 at 137.
14 ld. at 138-39.
15 38 C.R. 52; [1952] S.C.R. 746; 133 C.C.C. 1; 35 D.L.R. (2d) 386.
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raises a reasonable doubt as to whether he was, through no fault of his own dis-
abled when he undertook to drive and drove from being able to appreciate and
know that he was or might become impaired.1'
After citing (approvingly) this obiter dicta of Mr. Justice Ritchie as to
the rebuttable presumption that an impaired state is voluntarily induced for
purposes of s. 223 (now s. 234), de Grandpr6, J. goes on to suggest that
"in the case at bar, such a rebuttable presumption has arisen." Unfortunately,
he does not tell us whether he is referring to a rebuttable presumption that
Kundeus was voluntarily selling L.S.D. or whether the rebuttable presumption
in the case at bar refers to the knowledge of the character of the drug which
Kundeus was selling. If the learned Justice is referring to the former, then his
remarks are totally superfluous, since there was no suggestion that Kundeus
through no fault of his own was impaired by a drug which rendered his con-
duct involuntary. If de Grandpr6, J. is referring to a rebuttable presumption
that Kundeus must be taken to have intended to sell L.S.D., then it hardly
seems appropriate to cite King as authority for this proposition, for no such
issue arose in that case.
Whatever the majority was referring to in its reference to "such a re-
buttable presumption", they were not satisfied that the accused had met the
evidentiary burden which it placed upon him. On the contrary, de Grandpr6,
J. concludes that since no evidence was tendered by the accused, it "was not
possible to find that he had an honest belief amounting to a non-existence of
rnens rea and the Court of Appeal was in error in its conclusion."'
7
What the majority seems to be saying in these passages is that the accused
as a matter of law must be deemed to have knowledge of the character sub-
stance which he is selling. Moreover, if the accused does not call evidence, it
is impossible to rebut the presumption of knowledge. Further, the lower courts
were in error for having relied on the evidence of the undercover police officer
to reach the conclusion that Kundeus was labouring under a mistaken belief
as to the nature of the drug he was selling.
The surprising feature of this portion of the majority's decision is that
it does not seem to have appreciated how substantial a change in the law con-
cerning the burden of proof in drug offenses that it was making in this brief
paragraph. No compelling reasons of logic or social policy are offered to
justify the change which these statements will make in the trial process. For
example there is no argument that overwhelming problems of proving or dis-
proving the accused's knowledge necessitates placing the burden on him to
rebut by his own evidence the legal presumption, for this type of charge. Yet
the practical effect of this decision will mean that the accused will in most
cases be forced to take the stand and testify on his own behalf and, of course,
be subject to cross-examination.
In view of the significant ramifications of this ruling by our highest court,
we might have expected some weighty reasons for taking such a step. We
look in vain for such reasons. We are offered only a side-handed analogy
la Id., [1962] S.C.R. at 763.
17 Supra, note 3 at 139.
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reference to the rebuttable presumption which is said to have arisen in the
facts of Regina v. King. Yet, as mentioned above, the statements in King are
obiter, and were directed to the issue of voluntariness, not knowledge. Yet
the majority blithely treats the bombshell which it has dropped in the para-
graph as a self-evident conclusion, requiring no further explanation. We are
left with a new presumption of law, qualitatively different both in focus and
in effect from the common law presumption of fact that an accused must be
taken to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions,
as well as the presumption of voluntariness which the Court had recognized
as coming out of King.
Perhaps Mr. Justice de Grandpr6's decision should be read not as a
radical departure from the current law on the burden of proof in drug cases,
but merely as a disagreement with the trial judge and/or Court of Appeal
about what the record indicated to be Kundeus' belief. In other words, we
can interpret the majority's decision simply as reaching a different conclusion
about the facts than the lower courts. The problem with this view is that it
does not appear to adhere to the record which was available to the Supreme
Court and agreed to by Counsel. One can question the priority of our final
Court of Appeal acting in this manner. As one learned commentator notes
in this regard:
Too frequently, the Supreme Court and other appellate courts in Canada seem
more interested in re-arguing or reinterpreting facts rather than laying down for
the guidance of the lower courts, fundamental principles of substantive criminal
law.18
It is significant that Chief Justice Laskin in his dissent felt compelled by
the record to accept the view of the facts which had been adopted by the
British Columbia Court of Appeal and had been agreed to by counsel when
the factums to the Supreme Court were filed. The Chief Justice vigorously
objected to hearing the submissions of counsel for the appellant Crown when
it raised this issue. The basic problem, of course, is that there has not been
developed in Canada a sufficient body of jurisprudence on appellate law and
procedure. 19 But perhaps the more plausible explanation for this dispute at
the hearing was that the majority was more concerned with the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused than the role it should play as our highest judicial body
in developing the criminal law. Yet, depending on how one feels about the
other interpretations of this decision, this seeming reversal of the lower courts'
interpretation of the facts may be seen as a most palatable or, at least, a more
plausible construction of the majority's manner of disposition of the appeal.
The reason why one may interpret the majority's decision in Kundeus
in these two distinct ways, is that Mr. Justice de Grandpr6 refers to various
"readings" of the facts. As we discussed above, he says that "one reading"
of the facts is that "the accused offered L.S.D. for sale, and in fact, sold
'8 Graham Parker, Annotation, "Mistake of Fact versus Transferred Intent", 32
C.R.N.S. 150 at 154.
19 See, also, Morgentaler v. The Queen (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449; 53 D.L.R.
(3d) 161 (1975).
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L.S.D.". On that reading there seems little doubt that the charge had been
proved and the conviction should have been affirmed in full.20 However, de
Grandpr6, J. goes on to set out "another reading" by the Court of Appeal
(that the accused thought he was selling mescaline), and then states:
Assuming that this reading of the trial judge is the proper one, was the Court of
Appeal right in holding that the necessary mens rea had not been proved? I
do not believe so.2 1
The difficulty with this alternate interpretation of the ratio decidendi of
Kundeus is the failure of the majority to provide any reasoned argument which
would illustrate how it reaches this conclusion. The only explanation offered
is a short reference to one segment of Regina v. Blondin2 2 holding that to
support a charge of importing narcotics into Canada, the Crown need not
prove that the accused knew that the substance he is importing is cannabis
resin, but only must be aware that the substance is a narcotic made illegal by
the Narcotics Control Act. In the words of Mr. Justice Robertson, in that case
"it would be sufficient to find in relation to a narcotic, mens rea in its widest
sense." 28 De Grandpr6, J. then states that Blondin must be read with King
and concludes that:
[i]n my view, the result in Regina v. Custeau was the proper one and this notwith-
standing the error committed by the Court of Appeal of Ontario and underlined
by the Court of Appeal of British Columbia in the case at bar, mescaline having
been described as a controlled drug when it is a drug mentioned in the regulations
under the Act which cannot be sold without a prescription.
2 4
The references to two "readings" of the facts, together with this failure
to spell out the reasons for its conclusion, whereby it approved the result in
Custeau and reversed the British Columbia Court of Appeal's decision in the
instant case, inevitably caused confusion in lower courts seeking guidance from
the majority's decision in Kundeus. Predictably, in one of the first decisions
after Kundeus in the lower courts, Regina v. Williams,25 where the fact pattern
was similar to that in Kundeus, the learned judge voiced the dilemma in which
the enigmatic decision of the majority had placed him. Faced with the two
distinct versions of the ratio decidendi of Kundeus, he refused to hold that
Kundeus had settled the major substantive issue in the area of mens rea. In
view of the fact that any conclusions concerning the redefinition of that
doctrine of mens rea would have to be based solely upon vague interpolation,
he decided that "it would be rash to attempt such a task when another more
plausible reading of the judgment is apparent. '26 Instead, the learned provin-
cial court judge read de Grandpr6, J.'s decision as based on the manner of
proving mens rea:
20o Supra, note 3 at 137.
21 Id. at 138.
22 Regina v. Blondin, supra, note 7, 2 W.W.R. at 6.
23 Id. at 13-14.
24 Supra, note 3 at 140.
25 Regina v. Williams, [1976] 3 W.W.R. 120, Provincial Court of B.C.
2
6 1d. at 127.
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An attempt to re-define the concept of mnens rea on the basis of the implications
of the majority judgment in the Kundeus case would raise many uncertainties
since there is no discussion in the judgment as to the extent of the modifications
that should be made. Would mens rea exist if the intended act violated any of the
sections of the Food and Drug Act including those dealing with the sale of rotten
food (section 4 (c))? Would the doctrine extend to intended violations of the
Criminal Code or other statutes? For example, if Kundeus had thought the sub-
stance was a packet of sugar stolen from a nearby restaurant, could he have been
convicted? Would an intended violation of a provincial offence suffice? The judg-
ment of de Grandpre J. in the Kundeus case does not answer these questions, and
I do not think it should be assumed that this omission is an oversight. It seems
more sensible to conclude that the ratio decidendi of the case concerns the un-
rebutted evidentiary presumption. So interpreted, the judgment is inapplicable to
the case at bar since the accused took the stand here and rebutted any presumption
of mens rea that existed.27
While it must be admitted that the majority's decision in Kundeus may
leave more questions about mens rea unanswered than it purports to settle,
we must also recognize that to limit its application as in Wiliams may not be
a fair interpretation. Does it seem plausible that the express approval of the
result in Custeau in the penultimate paragraph of de Grandpr6, J.'s opinion
was meant to be a mere afterthought? While the majority's references to the
doctrine of mens rea might be confusing, are they merely obiter dicta in view
of the express approval of the interpretation of the facts taken by the Court
of Appeal for purposes of this segment of their opinion, and particularly in
view of the strong dissent of Laskin and Spence, JJ. which is directed
primarily at this very issue? To be more specific, if Williams is right on the
meaning of the majority's decision in Kundeus, does this mean that the dis-
senting opinion of Laskin and Spence, JJ. must be the accepted view? Yet
how would this jibe with the result in Custeau with which the majority was
in accord? Does this inconsistency present an insurmountable roadblock to
accepting the interpretation of Kundeus taken in Williams?
The majority's opinion leaves us with a myriad of questions but little
material on which to base our answers. Is this the style of decision-making
that should characterize the final Court of Appeal? Why should lower courts
(as in Williams), be forced to engage in a form of psycho-analysis in order
to determine the ratio decidendi of a Supreme Court decision? In Kundeus,
the Supreme Court was confronted squarely with a case which required them
to decide an issue involving a major policy decision as to the meaning and
function of mens rea. Yet, as noted above, the court seems to have avoided
this issue and to be more concerned with the disposition of this individual
case. As a result, the majority got sidetracked and discussed issues that were
not the basis for the appeal and which counsel may not have been prepared
to argue. Thus, rather than addressing themselves to the substantive issue,
the majority can be interpreted as having decided only that Kundeus was
guilty as charged. Surely this is not the proper role that the highest appellate
court should play but is rather the primary responsibility of the trial courts.
Unfortunately, Kundeus is not an isolated example of this ad hoc approach
that the Supreme Court has taken when confronted with cases that present
2
7 Id. at 130.
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major questions in the development of Canadian law.28 What is most surprising
is that the majority's decision seems to completely ignore the dissenting de-
cisions of Laskin and Spence, JJ. Almost as if the two opinions arose from
two different appeals and were argued in separate courts on different days,
neither opinion comes to grips with the issues that concern the other. While
the majority concentrates on the issue of the manner of proof of the offence,
the dissent was exclusively concerned with the substantive question as to
what proof was required. The decisions taken together seem like two ships
passing in the night.
The dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Laskin was premised
on the assumption that the record forced the Supreme Court to adopt the
interpretation of the facts taken by the Court of Appeal. As such there is no
reference in his decision to any rebuttable presumptions of knowledge and no
analogies to King as we saw in the majority opinion. Unlike the majority de-
cision, Laskin, C.J.C. right at the outset sorts out the gist of the case as a
question of law about the substance, not the proof of mens rea. Then the Chief
Justice launches into a lucid, easily discernible line of argument towards his
conclusions. The argument which he presents is well organized, and utilizes
a wide variety of material in its development. For example, he refers to judicial
authority not only from Canadian courts, but also English, and Australian
decisions. Moreover, Laskin, C.J.C. canvasses various legal texts, digests,
law journal articles, and the American Law Institute Model Penal Code in
support of his conclusions. The result of these efforts is a well-balanced
exercise in judicial craftsmanship which attempts to lay out the issues in their
full dimensions and to answer them in a definitive fashion. It is the style of
decision-making which we should expect from our highest tribunal but is so
lacking in the majority's decision. Yet while we may applaud the Chief Justice
for the manner in which he writes his opinions, we may still criticize the sub-
stance of his reasoning. On the other hand, while the majority's decision may
be unsatisfactory in offering no cogent reasons for its conclusions on the sub-
stantive issue, we may still agree with the result and supply our own reasons.
It is to this substantive issue to which we now direct our attention.
D. MENS REA AND MISTAKE OF FACT
When we analyse the substance as opposed to the style of Laskin, C.J.C.'s
opinion, it becomes clear that however talented the legal craftsman who wrote
this argument, his fundamental approach to the issue of mens rea has placed a
severe limitation on the meaning which he accords to that concept. The Chief
Justice, in analyzing the doctrine of mens rea, starts with a premise which
shapes his whole approach to the subject. For him, mens rea constitutes the
mental element of the crime. Once having accepted this definition, the Chief
Justice proceeds to a tight analytical dissection of the instant case to determine
what element must be shown to obtain a conviction. It is with this premise
and this approach that we take issue with Chief Justice Laskin. For it is sub-
mitted that these two factors prevent the Chief Justice from seeing clearly the
underlying values and policies that should shape his decision.
28 See, generally, Paul Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and The Doctrine of
Mens Rea, 49 Can. Bar Rev. 280.
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Having at the outset stated our basic critique of the dissenting opinion
in Kundeus, let us proceed to analyse it in detail and then to suggest an
alternative approach to the issues presented. The dissenting judgment charac-
terizes the appeal as presenting the three essential questions: 29
1) Whether mistake of fact arises at all as a separate defence for the accused
in the face of the burden on the Crown to prove mens rea as an element
of the offence charged.
2) Whether mistake of fact must be objectively reasonable or whether it is
enough that it be based upon an honest belief.
3) (Which is tied to #1), whether mistake of fact is shown by proof that,
on the facts as the accused honestly believed them to be, he was innocent
of the offence charged, albeit guilty of another offence, or whether he must
show that he was innocent of any offence.
Laskin, C.J.C. summarily answers the second issue in the negative by
referring to D.P.P. v. Morgan and in particular to Regina v. Beaver as having
conclusively settled this issue. He quotes with approval 30 the statement of
Cartwright, J. in the Beaver case, as authority for the proposition that where
serious criminal charges are involved:
... the essential question is whether the belief entertained by the accused is an
honest one and... the existence or non-existence of reasonable grounds for such
belief is merely relevant evidence to be weighed by the tribunal of fact in de-
termining that essential question31
The first and third issues Laskin, C.J.C., quite properly considers to be
related. Concerning the alleged mistake of fact in this case, he indicates that
it does not arise as an affirmative defence for the crime for which Kundeus
was charged. In short, in Laskin, C.J.C.'s opinion, trafficking in L.S.D. in-
cludes the element of mens rea as an ingredient of the offence, to be proved
by the Crown. Mistake of fact in this context presumably would prevent the
Crown from fulfilling this part of its obligation. Thus if "mistake is put forward
on behalf of the accused, it is only by way of meeting an evidentiary burden
and raising a reasonable doubt that the Crown has met the persuasive burden
of proof resting upon it."1 In other words, Laskin, C.J.C. assumes that the
offence of trafficking in L.S.D. includes as part of the Crown's case, proof
of knowledge by the accused of the nature of the impugned substance. While
the Chief Justice seems to approve of the reasoning in Blondin, i.e., that proof
of knowledge by the accused that he was trafficking in a restricted drug, even
if it not be L.S.D., would be enough to fulfill the Crown's burden, it is clear
that he is not dealing with that situation in this instant case, where the drug
is on a lower scale of prohibition and regulation.m
Thus the first two questions posed by the dissent are answered in the
negative. The key issue in this appeal becomes whether Kundeus would be
29 Supra, note 3 at 144-45.
so ld. at 145.
31 Beaver v. The Queen, supra, note 7, [1957] S.C.R. at 534.
3 2 Supra, note 3 at 144.
33id.
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innocent of the offence charged, if had the facts been as he supposed, he would
have been guilty of another, lesser offence. The Chief Justice answers this
question in the affirmative.
In deciding that an acquittal is required in these circumstances, Laskin,
C.J.C. explicitly disapproves of the judgment of Brett, J., in Regina v. Prince,
to the contrary. He says that the view in Prince is "no longer sustainable",
and favours the approach of Glanville Williams34 who treats this situation as
an instance of the rule of transferred intent formulated as follows:
The accused can be convicted where he both has the mens rea and commits the
actus reus specified in the rule of law creating the crime, although they exist in
respect of different objects. He cannot be convicted if his mens rea relates to one
crime and his actus reus to a different crime, because that would be to disregard
the requirement of an appropriate mens rea.
3 5
Since Laskin, C.J.C. had already concluded that selling mescaline and
trafficking in L.S.D. were not the "same crime", he would not transfer the
intent (mens rea) of one crime to the actus reus of the other. He goes on to
analyze several Provincial appellate court decisions in this area,36 approving
of the cases which support his view37 and disapproving or distinguishing those
which are contrary to the position he has taken.38 He concludes this review
of the Canadian case law with the observation that:
Is any general principle deducible from the foregoing catalogue of instances?
Certainly, it cannot be said that, in general where mens rea is an ingredient of an
offence and the actus reus is proved it is enough if an intent is shown that would
support a conviction of another crime, whether more or less serious than the
offence actually committed. The matter in terms of principle, depends on how
strict an observance there should be of the requirement of mens rea. If there is to
be a relaxation of the requirement, should it not come from Parliament, which
could provide for the substitution of a conviction of the lesser offence in the same
way as provision now exists in our criminal law for entering a conviction on an
included offence?
39
But according to Laskin, C.J.C., this "sensible" solution is not open to
the Supreme Court, presumably since it would constitute a radical departure
from settled principle on this subject in Canadian law. In the opinion of the
learned Chief Justice, what the Crown should have done in this case, was to
charge Kundeus with attempted sale of mescaline. 40
The analytic approach to mens rea to which Laskin, C.J.C. adheres may
S4 Criminal Law: The General Part 2d Edition (1961).
35 Id. at 129.
36 Viz. McLeod, supra, note 5; Burgess, Blondin, Custeau, Ladue, supra, note 7.
87 Viz. McLeod, Blondin, Burgess, Custeau, supra, note 7.
38 Viz. Ladue, supra, note 7.
39 Supra, note 3 at 148-49. This is the approach adopted by the American Law
Institute Model Penal Code (1962) Article 204(2). "although ignorance or mistake
would otherwise afford a defense to the offence charged, the defense is not available if
the defendant would be guilty of another offence had the situation been as he supposed.
In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade
and degree of the offence which he may be convicted to those of the offence of which
he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed."
40 Id. at 150.
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be termed the 'positive' approach. This approach has dominated most judicial
and academic comment on the subject in this century. Notable examples of
its exposition include the works of Glanville Williams, Professors Smith and
Hogan, and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, all of which
were referred to by the Chief Justice during the course of his opinion. The
Supreme Court of Canada has also treated mens rea in this manner in its
leading cases of the past two decades, viz. Beaver, Rees and Pierce Fisheries.41
This approach to mens rea attempts to identify particular states of mind and
"to attribute them to each of the material elements constituting the disposition
of particular criminal offences."42 In short, the concept of mens rea is analyzed
in terms of the "mental element of the crime". This "mental element is not
one particular state of mind for each offence, but rather a complex combina-
tion of states of mind, each bearing on a different element of the offence, in-
cluding the so-called defences. '43
The other conception of mens rea may be called the 'negative approach',
or better still, the 'functional' approach to this concept. On this view of
criminal offenses, certain defined forms of conduct are considered prima facie
criminal, unless they occur in circumstances which should excuse the actor
from criminal liability. Central to this view of the criminal law is the concept
of 'defeasibility'. Under this analysis, a person is guilty of a criminal offence
if he performed certain defined acts unless he was unconscious at the time
of his acts, or unless he was mistaken about the physical consequences of his
bodily movements, or unless he was subjected to threats or other gross forms
of coercion, and so forth.44
Proponents of this defeasible, functional approach to mens rea, argue
that the positive approach is both too narrow and too rigid. The positive
approach is criticized as too "narrow" since its definition of mens rea as "the
mental element necessary for the particular crime" turns out to be a misunder-
standing of the source and functions of the mens rea concept.45 The maxim
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea first appeared in Coke's Institutes. Glan-
ville Williams, Francis Sayre, Jerome Hall and other leading commentators
have interpreted Coke as saying that although there are exceptions to this
maxim, mens rea is the subjective state that makes an act punishable under the
law. On this theory, an absence of mens rea is simply an absence of the state
of mind prescribed by the statute. Recent scholarship in this subject has re-
jected this view of mens rea, both as misreading of Coke, and as a failure to
4 1 R. v. Beaver, supra, note 5. R. v. Rees, supra, note 5. R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd.
[1971] S.C.R. 5; 12 C.R.N.S. 272; 12 D.L.R. (3d) 591; [1970] 5 C.C.C. 193.
42 See, Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968).
4
3Id. at 106 and 105. For example, on a charge of theft under Section 283 (1) (a),
"the mental element" of the offence would include an absence, colour of right as well
as the presence of one of the so-called "specific intents" i.e. "to deprive, temporarily or
absolutely the owner of it or a person who has a special property or interest in it of the
thing or of his property or interest in it."
44 H. L. A. Hart; Punishment and Responsibility, (London: Oxford University
Press) at 28.
45 For a detailed development of this critique of the positive stance, see, George P.
Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis (1971) 119 U.
Penn. L. Rev. 401 at 411-15.
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see that mens rea is a notion which encompasses the issue of responsibility.4 6
On this alternative view, mens rea is not divorced from its normative connota-
tions but rather is viewed simply as encompassing the culpability of the act
in question. As Professor Fletcher concludes:
We require mens rea as an essential condition for criminal liability, not because
we realize intuitively that the condemnatory sanctions should apply only to those
who are justly condemned for their conduct, and men are not justly condemned
and deprived of their liberty unless they are personally culpable in violating the
law. That is the point of Coke's saying... the act is not culpable under the law
(actus non facit reum) unless the actor is culpable for acting as he did (nisi mens
sit rea). 47
In short, mens rea translated literally as 'guilty mind' refers not to the specific
subjective state of an accused but to his moral culpability in acting as he does.
Yet this narrow scope of the positive approach to mens rea is not the only
problem from which the Williams-Sayre-Laskin school of thought on that
subject suffers. Critics of their understanding of the concept of mens rea reject
the notion that the doctrine of mens rea should stand for a positive requirement
of an appropriate form of blameworthiness in every case. They do not admit
that the principle of mens rea has been developed to the stage where it has
changed from a collection of excuses to a "dissection of imputability". The
dimensions of this debate as to the role of mens rea have been succinctly stated
by Peter Brett in his seminal work, An Inquiry Into Criminal Guilt:
If one regards the principle of mens rea as no more than a phrase for collecting
together a number of excuses, the problem in each case raising the matter, will be
that of determining whether there is any reason for holding the accused to be
free from blame. On the other hand, if one regards the principle as involving the
enumeration of the conditions of imputability, one is forced to ask in each case
whether those conditions are present. This, in its turn, presupposes that we are
capable of enumerating in advance the conditions of imputability. And I doubt
whether this can be effectively done.. *48
Brett, like Hart and Fletcher, speaks of mens rea from a negative per-
spective. He asks whether there is any reason for holding the accused free
from blame, rather than whether the prosecution has proved the mental ele-
ment of the crime. He rejects the latter approach since he does not believe
that it is possible to identify in advance all of the possible excuses that might
serve to absolve the accused from blame. In his judgment, the search for the
conditions of imputability which requires a precise a priori analysis of mens
rea is never successful. Something is always left out. We cannot anticipate
and enumerate all of the conditions of blameworthiness in advance: better
not to try. Instead we can recognize blame when we see it, and should have
no need for an a priori defintion.
There are two key reasons why this functional analysis of mens rea,
which treats it as a series of excusing conditions, is so compelling. First, it is
4
6 See, Packer, supra, note 41; Kadish "The Decline of Innocence, 26 Camb. L. J.
273; P. Brett, An Inquiry into Criminal Guilt (Sydney: Lmv Book Co. of Australasia,
1963).
47 Supra, note 44 at 414.
4
8 Supra, note 45 at 41.
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clear that the doctrine or principle of mens rea was derived entirely from case
law. The principle is a creation of the judiciary, dispensing justice in individual
cases. In many instances, mens rea excuses were crafted as implied exceptions
to express or precise legislative commands. 49 Second, the principle of mens
rea has always been understood in a very loose sense. It has been translated
in a variety of ways including a "blameworthy state of mind", a "guilty mind",
an "evil intent", a "vicious will", and so forth. Yet, as Brett points out, while
the principle is usually stated in the form of a positive requirement, the illustra-
tions used to show its mode of operation are all negative in form:
The full exposition thus becomes an exhibition of a series of situations in which
a man will be held by the criminal law to be without guilt, unified by a very broad
and vague statement of principle. In short, what Hale, Hawkins and Blackstone
are really presenting to us is, to use the convenient phrase of Stroud, a collection
of excuses. The thread which connects together the various members of this family
of excuses is that in every instance the defendant is free from moral fault or
blameworthiness. 50
The criminal law is thus conceived as a combination of two types of
moral choices. The legislature performs the task of considering conduct at
large and makes a broad statement along the lines of, for example, "no one
shall print counterfeit money." The legislature does not spell out in advance
all the qualifications to this directive. The exceptions to these legislative com-
mands are left to the courts to formulate in individual cases, referring to the
second type of moral judgment embodied in the principle of mens rea. Of
course, the legislature may deem it advisable to determine in advance, in the
definition of the offence, many of the features that would be embodied in the
concept of mens rea and which distinguish one offence from another. For
example, the offence of theft can be distinguished from fraud or murder from
manslaughter, on the basis of a different "specific intent". Yet legislatures
do not feel bound to identify all the prerequisites to criminal liability in ad-
vance. Our system of democratic government has allotted this function to the
courts, and they have reacted accordingly, using the particular resources
available to them. The flexibility of this approach allows the basic values of
the criminal law to be applied to the unusual concrete situations which no
legislature could be expected to anticipate. For this reason:
[wihen a novel defence is raised, we cannot refuse to apply a new rule until the
legislature gets around to adopting it. In the interim the innocent individual who
should be excused because he was blameless will suffer the harsh injustice of
criminal punishment. It is precisely because a court can and does make law retro-
spectively that the defendant should be able to appeal to it for a new rule to be
applied to the old facts of his case.51
The structure of our Criminal Code reflects the strategy of combining
the institutional strengths of legislatures and courts to develop our criminal
law. The legislative effort at codifying most criminal law offences, 52 yet re-
taining the common law rules of justification and excuse 53 maintains the basic
49 Id. at 40.
50 Id. at 40-41.
51 Paul Weiler: In the Last Resort, (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974) at 102.
52 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, Ch. c-34, section 8.
53 Id., section 7(3).
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roles of legislature and courts that characterized the earlier development of
criminal law. While some common law defences have been expressly included
in the Criminal Code,54 it is significant for our discussion that mistake of fact
has not been dealt with in this fashion.a5 Presumably then, "mistake of fact"
should be approached along the same lines with which common law courts
have treated other so-called defences. In approaching this situation, a court
should refer to the concept of mens rea as stating the principle that a man
who is morally free from blame is not liable to punishment. In sum, the benefit
of interpreting the meaning and role of the principle of mens rea in this sense
is that it allows courts the flexibility to deal with novel instances of previously
recognized excuses, and to recognize new excuses should the situation require.
In my opinion, this is the most profitable way of analysis of mens rea, and
this view is consistent with the history of the development of that concept, is
supported by the wording and strategy of the Criminal Code, and is sustained
by the institutional characteristics of our courts and legislatures.
The functional approach to mens rea thus recognizes that the com-
plexities of the problem of excusing conditions cannot be captured in the
analytic approach that is used in the Williams-Sayre-Laskin school of thought.
The functional approach does not attempt to formulate in advance all the
rules that may excuse a person from criminal liability on account of his lack
of culpability. Rather the courts perform the task of unravelling the meaning
of mens rea on a case-by-case basis. Yet this function also requires the courts
to develop the family of excusing conditions in a manner that is in accord with
the institutional features that argue in favour of courts performing this role.
Translated into practical terms, this means that the courts in shaping the
meaning of mens rea on a case-by-case basis, must justify their conclusions by
referring to the policies and values which that doctrine should encompass.
If this style of decision making is not utilized, then we might expect that the
principle of mens rea will deteriorate into a hodge podge of ad hoc rules having
no real relation to each other. This prospect would dilute the effort to fashion
the excusing conditions upon the premise for the entire concept of mens rea,
i.e., the consensus of the community's moral opinion that no one should be
punished unless he is culpable.
E. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: HOW SHOULD REGINA v.
KUNDEUS HAVE BEEN DECIDED?
If we accept the functional view as to the function of mens rea in criminal
law, what can we say about the manner in which a court should have ap-
proached the sale of L.S.D. by Richard Kundeus? Certainly the excuse of
mistake of fact had not been developed to a degree whereby the facts as
presented in Kundeus would have presented merely another familiar example
of a well-formulated rule. Canadian case law on the subject had not produced
54 See, for example, ss. 16, 17, 19, 215.
55 c.f. A.L.I. Model Penal Code Article 2.04 which adopted the positive approach
of developing a detailed set of a priori prescriptions as to the method of handling this
situation.
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a consistent rule applicable to all instances where an accused was operating
under a mistake of fact.
The Supreme Court of Canada had decided some time earlier, that an
honest but mistaken belief in a state of facts would absolve an accused from
criminal guilt had the situation as supposed by the accused not involved any
crminal offence. 56 Moreover, this mistaken belief need not be reasonable in
order to excuse the accused from criminal liability.57 Yet the courts had never
developed a consistent rule about the effect of a mistake of fact in which if
the situation had been as the accused supposed, he would also have been
guilty of another criminal offence or other moral wrong. Instead, it was with
a series of confusing statements that courts disposed of these cases, yet gave
no real explanation for the value choices which they were making in reaching
their "conclusions".
Rather than provide reasons or explanations the lower courts were con-
tent to decide cases on whether "specific intent" had been proved,58 or whether
the offence only required proof of mens rea "in its widest sense."59 In each
case, the issue as to whether the particular mistake of fact was relevant on
this issue of criminal liability, was treated as an easily discernible conclusion
based on the construction of the particular statute creating the offence. Yet
in no case did the court see fit to explain how their conclusions were consistent
with the basic values and strategy of the criminal law. Thus, there were really
no legal restraints arising out of the doctrine of stare decisis that circumscribed
the approach that the Supreme Court could take to the Kundeus case.
Not only was the Supreme Court unfettered by stare decisis as it ap-
proached Kundeus, but it was also presented with a fact situation in this case
which clearly illustrated an example of where the underlying values in the
criminal law may conflict. As in the Beaver case, the facts in Kundeus provide
a context where the two contrasting perspectives on the criminal justice system
- which have been described as "crime control" and "due process" models
-would have to be identified and accommodated. The confrontation between
these two attitudes has shaped the evolution of the criminal law, especially
in the area of mens rea. The Kundeus case presented the Supreme Court with
a fact situation where these two attitudes would be graphically displayed. For
Kundeus asked the court to decide whether to give effect to an alleged ex-
cusing condition based on a lack of culpability, (the concern of the due
process model) in the face of the suggested insurmountable problem of
proving the non-existence of this excusing condition (the concern of the crime
control attitude).
The Kundeus case thus afforded the Supreme Court with a golden op-
portunity to settle the question as to the relevance of mistake of fact in this
type of fact situation, and to provide a clear statement of the operative reasons
56 R. v. Beaver, R. v. Rees, supra, note 5.
57 Id.
58 R. v. McLeod, supra, note 5 per Davey J.A.
59 R. v. Blondin, supra, note 7 per Robertson, J.A. R. v. Ladue, supra, note 7 per
Davey J.A.
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for reaching its conclusions. The response from the Court is an unhappy one
in the sense that neither the majority nor dissenting opinion comes to grips
with the policy arguments that can be offered either in favour of or against
the conclusions which they reach.
The majority decision seems to concentrate solely on the policies which
we can ascribe to the crime control model. The dissenting opinion seems con-
cerned primarily with the prospect of punishing an individual contrary to the
demands of the due process model.60 Yet our criminal law treats neither
objective as an absolute value. The policy of our criminal law:
[aissumes that without an effective sanction, we will not have a viable society
preserving the due process objectives of freedom and equality, but that there is
also no point in permitting the criminal law to offend against the principles of the
very society it is trying to protect. A workable compromise is necessary. We must
look at different situations pragmatically, assessing the weight of the claims of
each in concrete situations. 61
It was the obligation of the Supreme Court in Kundeus to work out the com-
promise between these two fundamental policies of the criminal law. But
instead, the two opinions concentrated on the one value to the exclusion of
the other.
In adopting the analytic approach to the problem, Laskin, C.J.C. reached
the conclusion that Kundeus must be acquitted of the charge of trafficking
L.S.D. since the mens rea or "mental element" of the offence, had not been
proved. As we discussed in the preceeding section of this paper, the problem
with this approach to the issue in Kundeus is that the court was never called
upon to clearly delineate the value choice involved in reaching this conclusion.
The matter is treated as though it is the responsibility of the legislature to
describe the offence, including the excusing conditions which would preclude
successful prosecutions. The role of the judiciary on this theory of mens rea
is merely to interpret whether mens rea is an ingredient of the offence and then
to determine whether on the facts it had been proved. Laskin, C.J.C. deals
with the issue as to whether he can apply the rule of "transferred intent", but
he never really outlines the values that this rule incorporates. His opinion
thus reads more like a logical syllogism rather than what we might expect,
where two potentially conflicting policies in the criminal law are presented
in the same case.
60 To be fair to Mr. Justice Laskin, he does indicate that while he would acquit
Kundeus in the charge of trafficking in L.S.D. this would not mean that Kundeus was
immune from the reaches of the criminal law. The Chief Justice suggests that Kundeus
should have been charged with attempted sale of mescaline. In his opinion such a charge
is "supportable under section 24 of the Code which makes it immaterial whether it was
possible or not to commit the intended offence". In support of this proposition Laskin
C.J.C., cites 10 Hals (3d) 306; Regina v. Scott, 45 W.W.R. 479; [1964] 2 C.C.C. 252
(Alta. C.A.). It is submitted that this blanket pronouncement that "the defence of im-
possibility of attempt is not available," is not as clear-cut as the learned Chief Justice
would lead us to believe in this statement. For example, other common law courts have
refused to convict where the impossibility of completing the offence was the result of the
operation of the law or mixed fact and law (e.g., Booth v. State, 398 P. 2d 893 (Okla.
Ct. Crim. App. 1964). See, generally, Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts -
Legality and the Legal Process, (1969) 53 Minn. L. Rev. 665.
6l Supra, note 51 at 97.
[VOL. 14, NO. 2
Case Comments
What Chief Justice Laskin appears to be concerned about, (but never
identifies) is the prospect of an accused who might subjectively be guilty of
a minor offence being convicted of an offence which would result in a greater
punishment. This result would seem grossly unfair and it runs afoul with the
point of the doctrine of mens rea, which is that we should convict only those
who have voluntarily chosen to commit an offence and so have deliberately
exposed themselves to a risk of punishment.
While we can support the due process interest in treating the accused
in such a way so as to maximize the individual freedom from the state, we
must also pay -attention to the demands of the crime control model. The ad-
vocates of this model argue against the expansion of excusing conditions on
the basis that the recognition of a new excuse would create a situation where
the doctrine of mens rea would be utilized to fabricate excuses by those who
are not really entitled to it. In short, the more loopholes to criminal liability
we recognize, the better the chance that persons will 'cook' their stories to
come under these protective umbrellas.
This latter concern seems to lurk beneath the surface of the majority
opinion in this case. The majority decision concentrates almost exclusively
on the proof problems that the Kundeus fact situation presents. The thrust of
the decision is to force the accused to take the stand and prove that he in fact
was labouring under a mistake of fact. The apparent rationale is that it is not
feasible for the Crown to be required to prove that a mistake of fact did not
exist in the mind of the accused. This would be particularly difficult task
where as in Kundeus, the accused did not adduce any evidence.
While these two policies seem to explain the operative reasons behind
the two decisions in this case, neither opinion identified nor sought to justify
its conclusions by referring to them. Instead we are left with the pronounce-
ment of two alternative rules with no suggestion that the judges really ap-
preciated the underlying reasons for their decisions. On the contrary, the
opinions are written as if the answers are obvious - as if the conclusions are
merely another articulation of a well recognized rule. And nowhere, do we get
any discussion of the opposing arguments. The opinions read like two ships
passing in the night.
If we apply the functional approach to mens rea to the facts in Kundeus,
what would be the result? Obviously, the functional approach would not treat
the issues presented as being merely an interpretation of a rule already antici-
pated and crudely dealt with in the definition of the offence. 2 The functional
approach would require that the Supreme Court decide whether mistake of
fact is an excuse in this case, but in reaching their decision they would have
to recognize that the two underlying policies of the criminal law were poten-
tially in conflict in this case, and then to reach a decision by weighing the
claims of each policy. Utilizing the functional approach to mens rea, it is
62 Nor does this latter view seem in accord with the actual definition of the offence
which on its face does not speak to the issue of the relevance of a mistake of fact as
to the nature of the drug sold. On the contrary, we are left with the bare definition of
"traffic" as meaning manufacture, sell, export from or into Canada, transport or deliver.
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possible to support the result of the majority's decision in Kundeus and to
supply the appropriate reasons for this conclusion which the Court reached.
There is no doubt that Kundeus sold L.S.D. to the undercover police
officer. As such, he has prima facie presented himself as a candidate for
criminal liability for the offence of trafficking in that substance. But does the
doctrine of mens rea absolve him from a conviction for his offence? A court
should approach this issue by asking itself "why should this accused be ex-
cused from criminal liability, when by his conduct he has clearly violated the
prohibitions of the criminal law?" This question is answered by referring to
the excusing conditions which are expressed in the notion of mens rea, that a
man who is morally free from blame in terms of the community ethicu is not
liable to punishment. One such excuse had only been recognized by the
Supreme Court when if the facts had been as he had supposed, the accused
would not have been guilty of any offence. This is not the case in Kundeus.
Richard Kundeus did have a mens rea in the sense that if the facts had been
as he supposed, he would have been committing another offence, that of
selling mescaline which is also prohibited by the Food and Drug Act. Kundeus,
then, was culpable. Subjectively, he was not blameless. He can accurately be
said to have mens rea. Accordingly, he does not qualify for the excusing con-
dition that the doctrine of mens rea affords those who are morally innocent.
The claims of the due process model are satisfied since while an excuse
would not be recognized in this case this is so only because the accused has
voluntarily selected himself as a candidate for criminal punishment. To have
recognized the accused's mistake in this case as an excusing condition would
have placed upon the Crown an extremely diffi ult problem of disproving the
existence of a condition to which the accused has the only reliable informa-
tional access.
Of course, this problem of disproving the existence of a mistake of fact
on the part of an accused was also a factor in Beaver. Max Beaver claimed
that he thought he was carrying milk of sugar rather than heroin. Yet the
Supreme Court recognized this mistaken belief as precluding a conviction for
possession of heroin, despite the obvious proof problems their decision would
create for the Crown. However, the situation in Kundeus seems qualitatively
different than the facts in Beaver. First of all; the chances of a trier of fact be-
lieving an accused who claimed to be under a mistaken view similar to that
of Max Beaver seem slim, especially in the absence of a strong corroborative
evidence to the effect that the accused was a victim or perpetrator of a drug
"rip-off". But the facts in Kundeus would not appear to be so unique, for it
is not unusual for the same entrepreneur to be engaged in the sale of a variety
of drugs. When apprehended, we could expect that the vendor might claim
that he was under a mistaken view as to the nature of the substance he was
selling. In this case the Crown would have a difficult time disproving such
belief, a task made even more burdensome due to the recent decision of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in Regina v. Risby.64
3 See, generally, Wasserstrom, H. L. A. Hart and Mens Rea (1967), 35 U. Chi.
Law Review 92.
04 Regina v. Risby, June 1976, B.C.C.A. per Branca, J.A.
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In Risby, on a charge of possession of marijuana for the purpose of
trafficking, the Court held that defence counsel should be allowed to cross-
examine a Crown witness in order to elicit an exculpatory statement made by
the accused at the time of his first being found in possession of the drug. In
fashioning this exception to the rule excluding self-serving statements, the
Court reasoned that a statement in the Risby context was part of the res gesta
of the offence, and thus properly admissable. The result of this decision
coupled with a recognition of the mistake in the Kundeus situation as an
excusing condition, could place the Crown in the unenviable position of having
to discredit part of its own evidence. If the accused declined to go into the
box, there would be no opportunity for the Crown to cross-examine him on
the reliability of his exculpatory statement. In view of these problems, it is
not surprising that the Supreme Court would be impressed by the "flood
gates" arguments against recognizing the mistake in Kundeus as a bar to con-
viction.
There is another reason why the Supreme Court was justified in recog-
nizing Max Beaver's mistake, but not that of Richard Kundeus, as an excusing
condition. In Beaver, as we noted above the crime control concerns in proving
the charges are not as compelling as in Kundeus. But more important, the due
process concerns are also much more prevalent in Beaver, since had the situa-
tion been as Max Beaver had supposed, he would not have been committing
any offence. In these circumstances, and in view of the mandatory jail sentence
for the offence charged, it would seem totally unfair not to recognize his
mistake as an excuse. On the other hand in Kundeus, if the facts had been as
the accused believed, he would still have been committing an offence, although
it involved a lesser maximum penalty. Thus in Kundeus, the claims of the due
process are not nearly as compelling as in Beaver. When seen in this light, the
conclusion reached is sound in criminal law theory and recognizes the practical
demands of the trial process. As such, Kundeus was properly condemned and
should be punished under our criminal law.
Thus, according to the negative approach to mens rea which we have
argued in favour of and then utilized, Kundeus would be guilty of trafficking
in L.S.D. There is no need to acquit Kundeus and then wait until Parliament
has relaxed the requirement of mens rea as suggested by the dissenting opinion
of the Chief Justice. It is submitted that the latter's decision is based upon a
misconception of the role and function of mens rea. The statute on its face did
not require the conclusion which Laskin, C.J.C. reached, nor does the prin-
ciple of mens rea at this stage of its development require legislative interven-
tion to fashion it to achieve the aims of the criminal law. On the contrary,
the courts are the appropriate organ to achieve these ends.
However, if we do not accept that the mistake of fact in Kundeus is an
excusing condition, that is not the end of the matter. We may convict Kundeus
of the offence charged, yet the nature of his mistake must certainly be relevant
to fashioning the appropriate sentence. Unlike the Model Penal Code, our
Criminal Code at this date does not speak in terms of the "grade" or "degree"
of an offence. Thus, technically it is impossible to adopt willy-nilly, the solution
to the problem of mistake of fact that the Model Penal Code suggests. Yet
since the purpose of dividing crimes into degrees is to award the more severe
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punishments for the higher degrees in which the offence may be committed,65
the Model Penal Code approach may be roughly transposed to the situation
which is presented in Kundeus, in the sense that the court should sentence
such the accused according to the degree of culpability which he has shown.
Kundeus' punishment should be related to the degree of his blame or guilt.
Or stated another way, he should receive the punishment which he would
have received had the situation been as he supposed. In this way, he can be
said to have chosen his punishment when he chose to perform the conduct
in the circumstances that he mistakenly believed to exist.
This rule of sentencing an accused such as Kundeus according to the
degree of culpability or blameworthiness he has shown is obviously in accord
with the retributive justification for punishment. At the same time the utili-
tarian justification of punishment which aims at reducing crime by the de-
terrent and/or rehabilitative effect of criminal sentences is also well satisfied,
for the deterrence theory is only workable if the accused has knowledge of the
legal sanction and the relevant circumstances in which he is operating. By
definition, to punish an accused for trafficking in L.S.D. when he thinks he is
selling mescaline would be useless. He will not be deterred from selling
mescaline by the stiffer sentence which trafficking in L.S.D. affords. Moreover,
he has not shown himself to be in need of the reformative gains of the higher
sentence since, subjectively, he did not think he was committing the greater
offence. Thus, given the legislative framework of the Food and Drug Act,
Kundeus should not receive more than the maximum penalty allowed for
selling mescaline. Any stiffer sentence would serve no useful purpose and
would violate the dictates of retributive justice.
In summary, it is submitted that the majority decision in Kundeus as it
relates to the substantive issue of mistake of fact may be supported by the
negative or functional approach to mens rea that was described above. But
the major concern of this paper is not whether the result reached by the
majority in this case was the correct one, but rather to sketch and argue in
favour of a different approach to mens rea, than that which is now being used
in our courts.60 The reasons which were suggested in support of the majority's
conclusion are intended only to illustrate how the functional approach to mens
rea would operate in a given case. The important points to note in this
illustration is that the functional approach t6 mens rea requires the courts
to recognize that the decisions it makes concerning the recognition of an ex-
cusing condition involves the weighing of claims of conflicting policies in the
criminal law. In the Kundeus fact situation, it is possible to argue in support
of the refusal to recognize the accused's mistake as an excusing condition
because the interests of the crime control model outweigh the objections of the
due process model of the criminal law.
Yet if we change the facts, we can see how in an analogous situation the
claims of the due process model might prevail. For example, suppose Kundeus
05 In many American states, murder is divided into two or three degrees. The death
penalty is available for first degree murder, less severe penalties such as life imprison-
ment for second or third degree murder.
00 Although there is a suggestion in Regina v. McLeod, supra, note 5; Mr. Justice
Davey used both the positive and negative approach to mens rea in rendering his decision.
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had been charged with importing heroin, and it was proven that he thought
he was smuggling a white facial powder into Canada, although on analysis
the substance turned out to be heroin. There is no doubt that in these cir-
cumstances Kundeus can be said to be morally culpable, since he thinks he is
committing a criminal offence. Prima facie he would not qualify for the excus-
ing condition that the doctrine of mens rea affords. Yet to refuse to recognize
his mistake of fact as an excuse would result in a conviction and necessarily
a minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment. 67 This result is radically
different from the disposition I defended above, in which Kundeus while con-
victed of trafficking in L.S.D. was sentenced to a term not exceeding the
maximum penalty for unlawful sale of mescaline. On the facts in Kundeus
we could support the majority's result because it is possible to effect an
appropriate compromise at the sentencing stage between the demands of
efficient law enforcement and due process. But where this compromise is not
possible (i.e., where a minimum mandatory sentence is involved) then the
demands of the due process model may outweigh the interests in efficient law
enforcement. As such, the mistake of fact in our hypothetical case should be
recognized by the court in its development of the family of excuses which
we call the doctrine of mens rea.
The key feature of this approach to mens rea is that it places squarely
on the shoulders of the judiciary, the responsibility for the evolution of the
concept of mens rea. The negative or functional approach to mens rea recog-
nizes the complexity of the issues involved which cannot be captured in the
positivist, analytical approach to mens rea used by the dissenting opinion in
Kundeus. When called upon to elaborate or modify an excuse which has been
recognized in other situations, or when asked to recognize a new excuse, our
courts need not feel that their hands are tied and that they must leave it to
Parliament to react to these claims. On the contrary, it is submitted that the
courts are the proper institution to develop the doctrine of mens rea to meet
the challenge presented by novel circumstances.
In placing on the courts this responsibility to develop the concept of
mens rea, we must also demand that their decisions are explicitly justified by
reference to the underlying values of the criminal law. For if the courts do not
provide reasoned demonstrations of how their legal handiwork fits with the
strategy of the criminal law, the meaning and role of mens rea will be replete
with inconsistencies, coloured by arbitrariness, and drained of its moral force.
F. CONCLUSION
The Kundeus case is a significant benchmark in the development of the
criminal law in Canada since it illustrates disturbing characteristics of our
Supreme Court. First, the legal craftsmanship exhibited by the majority is
totally inappropriate for our highest tribunal. The obfuscation of the issues
in Kundeus has created a situation where lower courts need resort to a form
of psychoanalysis in order to determine the real basis for the Supreme Court's
decision. Second, the approach to mens rea which is carefully articulated in
67 Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N.-1, Section 5(2).
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the dissenting opinion seems inadequate to meet the challenge of novel cir-
cumstances out of which the criminal law is forged. Finally, the Kundeus
case is disturbing because it illustrates that the Supreme Court is not acting
in a collegial fashion that should characterize the functioning of a final Court
of Appeal. The opinion of the majority and dissent bear no relation to each
other and if we didn't know better, would suggest that the authors heard
different appeals on different days. The opinions read like two ships passing
in the night. It is hoped that these pilots of our criminal law will soon get
the ship back on course.
